



Pure donation or hybrid donation crowdfunding: which model is more 
conducive to prosocial campaign success? 
 





Despite the growing research exploring the possibility and feasibility of financing socially 
oriented projects through crowdfunding, relatively little research examines which 
crowdfunding model is better to serve such purpose. This paper attempts to offer novel 
insights to mitigate this research gap.  
Design/methodology/approach 
A unique dataset collected from the largest Chinese crowdfunding platform is used to test 
the hypotheses. To solve the perceived self-selection problem, the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) method is adopted in this paper. Based on this approach, the results of 
similar prosocial campaigns in two different models (pure donation and hybrid donation) 
are compared.  
Findings 
The empirical results show that the hybrid donation model is negatively associated with 
the status of success and the extent of success of prosocial campaigns. Specifically, 
compared to the pure donation model, hybrid donation model leads to a lower probability 
of success, fewer contributors, a lower funding amount and a lower completion ratio. 
Originality/value 
The paper contributes to a relatively understudied theme in crowdfunding, namely – 
donations. It does so by introducing the concepts of pure versus hybrid donation models 
and investigates the model selection problem in financing social projects through 
crowdfunding based on cognitive evaluation theory.  
 
 






Crowdfunding is an innovative way to obtain entrepreneurial fundraising through hybrid 
logic. The hybrid logic includes the combination of social exchange and financial 
sustainability (Battilana and Lee, 2014). In crowdfunding, fundraisers collect small 
individual contributions to fund different types of projects via online crowdfunding 
platforms. Because of the use of information technology in the crowdfunding process, the 
costs of coordination and transaction in crowdfunding are much lower than those in 
traditional fundraising channels (Choy and Schlagwein, 2015).  
The possibilities of financing commercial campaigns via crowdfunding have been explored 
by numerous scholars (e.g., Short et al.,2017; Moritz and Block, 2016; Macht and 
Weatherston, 2015). In addition to commercial campaigns, crowdfunding is also applicable 
for funding prosocial purposes. Specifically, prosocial crowdfunding campaign can be 
defined as a crowdfunding campaign with both prosocial value proposition (delivery of a 
social benefit for a public) and certain characteristics of public goods (benefit is shared by 
members of the public). In particular, the donation-based crowdfunding has been 
considered as a proper model to support prosocial activities (Gerber and Hui, 2013). For 
instance, previous literature indicates the legitimacy and feasibility for financing social 
entrepreneurship (Lehner, 2013), health services (Berliner and Kenworthy, 2017), 
educational services (Meer, 2014), and charity (Liu et al.,2018) via donation-based 
crowdfunding.  
Although donation-based crowdfunding can be used to support prosocial campaigns, the 
reason why it is a proper model for financing prosocial purposes remains theoretically 
ambiguous and empirically unsettled. Furthermore, this question becomes more interesting 
by considering the perceived “free-rider” problem (Samuelson, 1954) lurking in donation-
based crowdfunding. The “free-rider” problem can be explained as a market failure which 
occurs when individuals benefit from public goods and do not pay for it (Samuelson, 1954). 
Previous literature on charitable giving mentions that the “free-rider” problem can be 
solved by offering extrinsic motivations to donors (e.g., Friedman and McAdam, 1992). In 
terms of crowdfunding, tangible rewards are a common way to extrinsically motivate 
contributors (Gerber and Hui, 2013). Therefore, it is meaningful to determine whether 
tangible rewards can be used to alleviate the “free-rider” problem by exploring the 
relationship between tangible rewards and prosocial campaign outcomes.  
More generally, this paper answers the question: which model, the hybrid donation model 
(donation model with tangible rewards option) or the pure donation model (donation 
without tangible rewards), is a better crowdfunding model for financing prosocial 
campaigns. Because previous crowdfunding research has paid little attention to this 
question, this study aims to fill this research gap. Such investigation is likely to be of great 
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importance for both prosocial campaign fundraisers and platforms in order to increase 
fundraising efficiency by tapping the right audiences, as well as accommodating their needs.  
Cognitive evaluation theory is a theory designed to explain the effects of extrinsic 
motivations on intrinsic motivations. Specifically, it focuses on examining how intrinsic 
motivation is affected by external motivations in a process called motivational "crowd-out" 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985). Based on the cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985), 
the perceived “free-rider” problem should be solved automatically by satisfying donors’ 
senses of enjoyment, competence and autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 1985). In addition, in the 
prosocial context, extrinsic motivations weaken the positive signal value of performing 
prosocial activities (Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Titmuss, 1971). Therefore, extrinsic 
motivations may backfire instead of adding up to intrinsic motivations via a “crowding-
out” mechanism (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997; Lepper and Greene, 1978). Similarly, 
in the prosocial crowdfunding context, it might be the case that offering tangible rewards 
in prosocial campaigns may crowd out donors’ intrinsic motivations to contribute. The 
“over-justification effect” and “need for autonomy effect” are two possible explanations to 
clarify the mechanism behind the “crowd-out” phenomenon. As a result, tangible rewards 
tend to be negatively associated with prosocial crowdfunding outcomes. In other words, a 
hybrid donation model may not be suitable for financing prosocial campaigns when 
compared to the pure donation model.  
To test this, an empirical study is conducted using the Chinese crowdfunding platform 
Zhongchou, (www.zhongchou.com), which is the largest reward-based crowdfunding 
platform in China (Zhao and Vinig, 2017). In our case we include campaigns that fell under 
the platform categories of supporting education, environmental protection, childcare, social 
enterprise, animal protection, and helping the elderly. By campaigning on this platform 
project owners can offer tangible rewards in their prosocial campaigns in addition to the 
common intangible rewards (e.g. satisfaction of contributing to a cause one is passionate 
about). Specifically, on this platform, it is possible to divide the campaigns into two 
categories: pure donation campaigns and hybrid donation campaigns.  Because of this 
special feature, this platform offers an ideal ground to test our hypotheses. 
Noting the perceived endogeneity bias due to the self-selecting process of offering tangible 
rewards in prosocial campaigns, a propensity score matching (PSM) method is used to 
“refine” the data. Based on the “refined” sample, the influence of tangible rewards on the 
outcomes of prosocial campaigns are examined by including the presence of tangible 
rewards and the number of tangible rewards as independent variables.  
After further robustness checks, significant evidence shows that tangible rewards crowd 
out intrinsic motivations in the prosocial crowdfunding context. In particular, the presence 
of tangible rewards is negatively associated with the success status of prosocial 
crowdfunding campaigns. Besides, tangible rewards also decrease the extent of success of 
prosocial campaigns by reducing campaigns’ total number of backers, total pledge amount 
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and completion ratio. In addition, the negative impacts become stronger if more tangible 
rewards are offered in such campaigns. These findings empirically confirm that the hybrid 
donation model is less preferable in fundraising for prosocial purposes.  
This paper offers four main contributions to the literature. First, this paper is the first to 
investigate model suitability for financing prosocial purposes through crowdfunding both 
empirically and theoretically. Based on cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985), 
we demonstrate that the hybrid donation model is less effective in financing prosocial 
campaigns compared to the pure donation model. Second, it enriches the emerging 
literature stream on financing non-profit prosocial projects and ventures through 
crowdfunding by confirming the feasibility of donation-based crowdfunding as a 
fundraising channel. Third, this paper introduces and argues for conceptual separation 
between hybrid and pure donation campaigns, enriching the relatively limited research on 
donation crowdfunding. Finally, this paper extends the application of cognitive evaluation 
theory by presenting the existence of a motivational “crowd-out” effect in the donation-
based crowdfunding context, and whether such effect will be altered if non-monetary 
incentives are adopted.  
The paper is structured as follows. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis, 
the research hypotheses are presented in the next section. The research data and 
methodology are then explained in detail. Next, the empirical results are discussed. Key 
findings, implications and future research directions are presented in the final section.  
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Supporting Non-profit Social Projects Through Crowdfunding  
An important portion of social projects are manifested in social entrepreneurship (SE), 
which is defined as prosocial entrepreneurial activities conducted by start-ups or 
entrepreneurs to develop, fund and offer solutions to social, cultural or environmental 
issues such as poverty alleviation, health care and community development (Dees, 1998). 
Based on its definition, non-profit SE aims to create public goods instead of commercial 
products or services. Fundraising is a vital step in entrepreneurial activities (Florin et al., 
2003). However, because of the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), new ventures 
have more difficulty attracting financial resources from external suppliers than established 
companies do. For non-profit social entrepreneurship, the initial financing problem is even 
more challenging (Lehner, 2013). Compared to commercial ventures, non-profit SE lacks 
a clear financial target (Sirisena and Shneor, 2018; Dacin et al., 2010; Moss et al., 2011). 
In addition, non-profit SE is rooted in the social sphere, which often associates it with more 
limited managerial abilities (Lehner, 2013). These conditions suggest that non-profit SE 
may not easily cover its financial needs through traditional fundraising means (Fedele and 




As an innovative way to approach fundraising, in crowdfunding small individual 
contributions are collected to support campaigns via online platforms. Thus, crowdfunding 
is also a suitable channel for financing non-profit SE. It is the social features that make 
crowdfunding different than other traditional financing channels (Wash and Solomon, 
2014). Crowdfunding as a social fundraising tool matches the mission of non-profit SEs 
well (Lehner, 2013). In addition, information technology has largely decreased the costs of 
coordination and transaction, which facilitates the funding of prosocial campaigns via 
online crowdfunding platforms (Choy and Schlagwein, 2015). Among different 
crowdfunding models, donation-based crowdfunding is the most suitable and common 
model for financing non-profit prosocial campaigns (Lehner, 2013). In addition to general 
crowdfunding features, donation-based crowdfunding provides extra legitimacy to 
prosocial campaigns through the “per se democratic” selecting process, which increases 
the likelihood that the crowd will choose to support highly needed prosocial causes (Drury 
and Stott, 2011). Donation-based crowdfunding enables individuals to produce public 
goods collectively by donating to prosocial campaigns. For illustration, DonorsChoose.org, 
a donation-based crowdfunding platform, has successfully supported public school 
teachers by effectively raising funds for education campaigns (Meer, 2014).  
Perceived Free-rider Problem in the Prosocial Context 
A public good is a good that everyone has equal access to and that no one can prevent 
others from consuming. An individual’s consumption of a public good will not decrease 
others’ enjoyment of it. These two features of public goods can be summarized as non-
rivalrous and non-excludable (Samuelson, 1954). Based on the definition of public goods, 
the products of prosocial crowdfunding campaigns can be treated as public goods because 
the products are goods with broad public benefits (Carr, 2013). Based on Olson’s (2009) 
collective-action model, in terms of donation-based crowdfunding, the fundraising process 
can be interpreted as contributors collectively establishing a “common pool” through 
donations for the provision of public goods without concrete tangible compensation.  
However, as a practice involving the private provision of public goods, donation-based 
crowdfunding may suffer from the “free-rider” problem (Samuelson, 1954). It describes 
the situation in which individuals may not want to contribute to public goods because they 
believe that others will contribute and they can consume public goods for free (Samuelson, 
1954). If being a “free-rider” becomes the common strategy when individuals face 
situations of private contribution to public goods, no public goods will be produced (Kim 
and Walker, 1984). For example, a campaign for environmental improvement from a 
donation-based crowdfunding platform aims to create better environmental conditions for 
all human beings. As the campaign’s product, the improved environmental condition can 
be consumed by everyone, even those that do not donate to this campaign. As a result, the 
campaign may fail, and no public goods will be produced. The “free-rider” problem tends 
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to be negatively associated with the outcomes of prosocial campaign fundraising. 
Therefore, it is crucial to solve the “free-rider” problem for successful fundraising.  
Previous collective action literature suggests that the “free-rider” problem can be alleviated 
if individuals’ utility is not only derived from the public goods but also from individuals’ 
own contributions (Friedman and McAdam 1992; Harbaugh, 1998; Oliver, 1980). 
Similarly, offering tangible rewards based on individuals’ contributions may act as a 
possible solution to solve the “free-rider” problem in donation-based crowdfunding. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to test whether indeed tangible rewards can be used to solve the 
“free-rider” problem and enhance success in prosocial crowdfunding. Further, this question 
can be conceptualized as “whether hybrid donation crowdfunding is a more suitable model 
than the pure donation crowdfunding model when financing prosocial projects”. To answer 
this question, it is crucial to understand what impacts contribution behavior in prosocial 
crowdfunding campaigns. In this context, motivation theory (Murray, 1964) offers a useful 
perspective to review and answer this question. 
Contributors’ Motivations in Supporting Prosocial Crowdfunding Campaigns  
Motivation is the inner state that directs and stimulates human behavior (Murray,1964). 
Vallerand (1997) describes motivation as the engine for individuals’ satisfaction of 
physiological needs. Deci and Ryan (2000) categorize individuals’ motivations into 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in their cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 
1985). According to Deci and Ryan (2000), an activity is intrinsically motivated if it reveals 
the reward itself or meets an individual’s primary psychological needs. Conversely, an 
activity is extrinsically motivated if it focuses more on external rewards or results.  
In general, contributors support crowdfunding campaigns for both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations. Contributors were found to be primarily motivated by collecting rewards, 
helping others, supporting causes or being part of a community (Gerber and Hui, 2013). 
Specifically, contributors are extrinsically motivated if they contribute in order to collect 
rewards. For example, contributors to commercial crowdfunding campaigns are motivated 
by collecting future products (Allison et al., 2015). Conversely, contributors are also 
considered to be intrinsically motivated if they contribute to help others, support causes or 
be part of a community. For instance, contributors to prosocial crowdfunding campaigns 
tend to be intrinsically motivated because they are willing to contribute even without 
external incentives. 
Compared to commercial campaign contributors, prosocial campaign contributors are more 
likely to be intrinsically motivated. They are willing to contribute to prosocial campaigns 
to alleviate social problems or help non-profit organizations based on pure altruism 
(Gerber and Hui, 2013; Ordanini et al., 2011). They may also enjoy the “warm glow” 
(Harbaugh, 1998) from contributing based on a philanthropic cause. The “warm glow” 
refers to the sense of joy and satisfaction derived from doing good (Andreoni,1990). In 
addition, an individual’s sense of guilt plays a significant role in contributing to prosocial 
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campaigns (Hibbert et al., 2007). Sitting on the sidelines will evoke the moral pressure of 
not helping, which will cause this sense of guilt. Guilt has negative effects on the 
satisfaction of personal utility (Elster, 1998). Moreover, an individual’s empathy also 
matters (Colombo et al., 2015; Gerber and Hui, 2013; Ordanini et al., 2011). For example, 
contributors may be motivated by a sense of personal familiarity with the situation of 
fundraisers, or by fairness concerns toward the individuals in need of help. These concerns 
tend to generate empathy based on contributors’ inequity aversion. Indeed, earlier studies 
suggest that empathy intrinsically motivates contributing behavior (Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  
The Effects of Extrinsic Motivations on Support for Prosocial Activities 
Based on the discussion above, it is assumed that individuals’ contribution behavior in 
prosocial campaigns stems from intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivations. Contributors 
participate to help others, support a cause or be part of a community (Gerber and Hui, 2013). 
In addition, they award themselves with a sense of enjoyment, competence and autonomy 
by performing the donation behavior (Deci and Ryan, 1985). Enjoyment, competence and 
autonomy are intangible rewards that act as selective incentives (Oliver, 1980) for 
contributing to prosocial campaigns. They explain why contributors are willing to 
contribute even without any material compensation. For instance, contributors feel happy 
if the campaigns they support are working well because they have contributed to alleviating 
the problems. These benefits are exclusive to contributors but not to “free-riders”.  
Here, some may suggest that by offering extra extrinsic motivations in terms of tangible 
rewards, campaigners may alleviate the “free-rider” problem. However, offering tangible 
rewards in prosocial crowdfunding campaigns can also be harmful. Extrinsic motivations 
and intrinsic motivations are sometimes incompatible. Specific to the prosocial 
contribution behavior context, the introduction of extrinsic motivation may decrease an 
individual’s intrinsic motivation level. This is called the “crowding-out” effect of extrinsic 
motivations on intrinsic motivations (De Charms, 2013; Deci et al., 1999; Deci, 1976; Frey, 
1993; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Greene and Lepper, 1974; Gneezy and Rustichni, 2000). The 
“crowding-out” effect can be relatively strong because participants in prosocial activities 
are intrinsically motivated (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2003; Leete, 2000). For instance, 
individuals tend to behave less rather than more generously in charitable giving if material 
or monetary rewards are offered as extrinsic motivations (Newman and Shen, 2012). 
Similar results can be found in blood donations (Mellström and Johannesson, 2008; 
Titmuss, 1971), charitable donations (Newman and Shen, 2012), volunteering work 
(Carpenter and Myers, 2010) and collective prosocial activities (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 
1997).  
Similarly, in terms of prosocial crowdfunding, which is one manifestation of prosocial 
activity, contributors are intrinsically motivated. Therefore, offering tangible rewards as 
extrinsic motivations may crowd out intrinsically motivated contributors’ willingness to 
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contribute. As a result, offering tangible rewards as extrinsic motivations can be negatively 
associated with the outcomes of prosocial crowdfunding campaigns. The mechanism 
behind such outcome can be explained further by two effects: the “over-justification” effect 
and the “need for autonomy” effect.  
The over-justification effect (Lepper et al., 1973) is derived from attribution theory (Kelly, 
1967) and self-perception theory (Bem, 1972). According to the over-justification effect, 
if an activity is intrinsically motivated, introducing extrinsic motivations may cause a 
decrease in intrinsic motivations, because extrinsic motivations bring too many choices 
(justifications) for performing the activity (Collins, 2015). In terms of contributing to 
prosocial crowdfunding campaigns, offering tangible rewards may shift the meaning of 
contributing from caring about social welfare into collecting rewards. Contributors may 
feel that they are influenced by an economic mindset instead of a prosocial altruistic 
mindset if tangible rewards are offered as extrinsic motivations in prosocial crowdfunding 
campaigns (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). This shift may taint 
contributors’ prosocial behavior (Heyman and Ariely, 2004). In addition, it is reasonable 
to assume that more tangible reward options will strengthen the “over-justification” effect.  
In addition, one can may claim that the addition of extrinsic motivations, via the offering 
of tangible rewards, may be viewed as a ‘waste of money’ that could have been better used 
in fulfilling the prosocial mission of the campaign. Here, contributors that are primarily 
intrinsically motivated may lose interest in supporting the campaign, as they would view 
the use of funding to cover costs of tangible rewards as an unnecessary and costly deviation 
from the primary social cause at the heart of the campaign.  
Accordingly, we propose the following hypotheses:  
H1: The presence of a tangible reward is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
success of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign.  
H2: The presence of a tangible reward is negatively associated with the extent of success 
of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign.  
According to cognitive evaluation theory, Deci and Ryan (1985) propose that individuals 
have intrinsic needs for autonomy. Autonomy describes whether an individual’s behavior 
is self-determined (De Charms, 2013). Individuals’ intrinsic motivations tend to be 
influenced by the satisfaction of innate needs. If this is the case, the introduction of extrinsic 
motivations will diminish individuals’ intrinsic motivations to perform tasks (Deci et al., 
1999). In terms of prosocial crowdfunding, it is reasonable to propose that potential 
contributors to prosocial campaigns will feel less likely to donate if they notice that tangible 
awards have been offered as the perceived rewards for contributing. These tangible rewards 
diminish the satisfaction of autonomy by adding extra control (Deci and Ryan, 1985). 
Contributors’ intrinsically motivated contributing behavior will be disrupted by the 
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controlling effect caused by offering extrinsic rewards. The degree of controlling effect is 
positively associated with the number of tangible rewards.  
Based on the previous discussion, we hypothesize the following:  
H3: The total number of tangible rewards in a prosocial crowdfunding campaign is 
negatively associated with the extent of success of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign.  
Data and Variables 
Data 
China is considered as the global leader in alternative finance and crowdfunding (Ziegler 
et al., 2019), where volumes of donation and reward crowdfunding have reached more than 
USD 5 billion in 2017 (Ziegler et al. 2018). The data used in the current study were 
collected from Zhongchou (www.zhongchou.com), the largest reward-based crowdfunding 
platform in mainland China. This platform has served as an accepted context of study in 
earlier research (Bi et al. 2017; Yuan et al. 2016; Zhao and Vinig, 2017; Zhao and Vinig, 
2019). Like other reward-based crowdfunding platforms, Zhongchou follows an “all-or-
nothing” strategy for campaign management. This strategy means that fundraisers can only 
receive the funds raised if the campaigns successfully reach their funding goals. 
Furthermore, Zhongchou has unique features. In addition to commercial campaigns, non-
profit prosocial campaigns are also accepted. These prosocial campaigns are listed under 
the category “prosocial crowdfunding” and are separated from the commercially oriented 
reward campaigns.  More specifically, the prosocial campaigns fell into six sub-categories: 
supporting education, environmental protection, childcare, social enterprise, animal 
protection, and helping the elderly. 
On this platform, every prosocial campaign must offer at least one reward option for 
backers to choose. To promote backers’ engagement and attract more backers to contribute, 
the form of reward is not limited to tangible rewards. Specifically, the rewards can be 
intangible, tangible or both. An intangible reward is a common approach for prosocial 
campaigns because the campaigns aim to produce public goods for the greater society 
rather than goods for individual private consumption. Intangible rewards usually take the 
forms of virtual hugs or thank-you e-mails. In principal, prosocial campaigns offer 
intangible rewards and donors are given no tangible compensation. In this case, it works 
similar to the classic donation-based crowdfunding model. However, it is also possible to 
offer tangible rewards in prosocial campaigns. Specifically, tangible rewards usually take 
the forms of campaign-related personal recognition souvenirs (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 
2017) such as t-shirts or mugs with campaign logos as in classic reward-based 
crowdfunding model. In addition, it is also possible to arrange a prosocial campaign in a 
hybrid way by offering both tangible and intangible rewards. Hence, by accommodating 
reward, pure donation, and hybrid donation models the setting of Zhongchou offers an ideal 
ground to test our hypotheses.  
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The final dataset contains 2,167 campaigns posted on Zhongchou in a one-year period from 
January 2016 to December 2016 in the category of prosocial crowdfunding. Campaigns 
that started in 2016 but finished after 2016 are excluded, along with the campaigns with 
missing information and cancelled campaigns. Before collecting campaign-based 
information, the introductions of the campaigns are checked to ensure that all the 
campaigns in the initial sample aim to create public goods. For each campaign in the dataset, 
the following information is collected by a self-designed web-crawler program: funding 
target; sub-category; post time; location; description length; duration; reward levels; 
reward description; introduction video or not; picture number; total pledge; final backer 
number; final status and final completion ratio.  
—Insert Table 1 about here— 
Variables 
The dependent variables, independent variables and control variables are coded based on 
the collected information.  
In terms of dependent variables, Ahlers et al. (2015) suggest that the outcome of a 
crowdfunding campaign is a multifaceted concept and should be evaluated by multiple 
standards. Based on the suggestions from previous literature (e.g., Cumming et al., 2015), 
four dependent variables from two perspectives are used to measure the outcomes of 
prosocial crowdfunding campaigns. Status is a binary dummy variable that describes the 
final status of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign. It takes a value of 1 if a campaign 
reaches its funding target successfully and a value of 0 if fundraising falls short. In addition, 
three measures have been used to capture extent of success. Here, backer_num is used to 
represent the total number of contributors in a prosocial campaign. In addition, 
total_pledge represents a campaign’s total amount of money collected at the end of its 
fundraising period. Completion_ratio measures the ratio of total_pledge sum out of the 
target sum.  
For independent variables, each campaign was assigned a unique type. Here, based on the 
reward descriptions of the campaigns, a campaign was coded as “pure donation” if only 
intangible rewards can be found in its reward descriptions. Similarly, a campaign was 
coded as “hybrid donation” if both tangible and intangible rewards are described. A 
campaign was coded as “pure reward” if only tangible rewards can be found in its reward 
descriptions. As a result, 202 “hybrid donation” campaigns, 1,965 “pure donation” 
campaigns and 0 “pure reward” campaigns were included. It should be confusing to see 
that no “pure reward” campaign data was presented in our dataset. We have generated some 
possible explanations to rationalize it. Normally, prosocial crowdfunding, a special type of 
charitable giving, no materialized rewards should be offered according to the essence of 
charitable giving. In addition, charitable contributions are usually in smaller amounts when 
compared to the commercial contributions. Therefore, it was difficult for project creators 
to cover their costs (e.g., produce the rewards, shipments etc.) if they choose to offer the 
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contributors materialized rewards. Therefore, in our case, no pure reward campaigns are 
listed in the prosocial setting can be explained to some extent. The campaigns with tangible 
rewards account for 9.32% of the entire sample. A binary dummy variable 
tangible_reward_dummy is used to represent whether a prosocial campaign has adopted 
tangible rewards. A “hybrid donation” campaign is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. In addition, 
we use tangible_reward_num as the other independent variable to indicate the number of 
tangible rewards of a “hybrid donation” campaign.  
Regarding control variables, prior literature indicates that campaign quality is positively 
related to crowdfunding outcomes (Mollick, 2014). A campaign has a higher probability 
of success if it offers more campaign-related information as quality signals. Detailed 
campaign descriptions, more pictures and video pitches are three common quality signals 
in crowdfunding campaigns (Mollick, 2014; Ahlers et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2015), and 
are assumed to alleviate information asymmetry by the supply of extra information. 
Therefore, video, pic_num and wordcount are used as control variables in this paper. Video 
is a binary dummy variable. If there is a descriptive video on a campaign webpage, it is 
coded 1, and 0 otherwise. pic_num describes the total number of pictures posted on a 
campaign’s webpage. Wordcount represents the length of a campaign’s descriptive content 
in Chinese characters. In addition, based on previous crowdfunding literature (e.g., Mollick, 
2014), other factors that tend to influence the outcomes of crowdfunding campaigns are 
also controlled for, including location, sub_category, target, duration, month and 
intangible_reward_num.  
Due to the high skewness of real crowdfunding data, some of the non-dummy variables are 
not normally distributed with long tails. To satisfy asymptotic normality and increase 
prediction accuracy, the natural log transformations of all the skewed variables are 
conducted before the regression analyses. The definitions of variables are summarized in 
Table 1. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables.  
—Insert Table 2 about here— 
Models and Methodology 
Models  
The hypotheses are tested by three models respectively: 
Whether the presence of tangible rewards (tangible_reward_dummy) is negatively 
associated with the status of success (status) of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign is 
tested in Model 1. 
statusi = β0 + β1 tangible_reward_dummyi+ β2 control_variablesi + εi      (1) 
In Model 2, the way in which a tangible reward (tangible_reward_dummy) influences the 
extent of success (backer_num, total_pledge and completion_ratio) of a prosocial 
crowdfunding campaign is examined.  
12 
 
Yi = β0 + β1 tangible_reward_dummyi + β2 control_variablesi + εi         (2) 
Model 3 tests how the number of tangible rewards (tangible_reward_num) affects the 
extent of success (backer_num, total_pledge and completion_ratio) of a prosocial 
crowdfunding campaign. 
Yi = β0 + β1 tangible_reward_numi + β2 control_variablesi + εi              (3) 
In all the three models, i indicates the prosocial crowdfunding campaigni. Statusi is a binary 
dummy variable representing whether campaigni reached its funding target (Yes=1, No=0). 
Yi is a series of dependent variables indicating the campaigni’s extent of success, including 
backer_num, total_pledge and completion_ratio. Tangible_reward_dummyi is a binary 
dummy variable indicating whether the campaigni offers a tangible reward (Yes=1, No=0). 
Tangible_reward_numi is a continuous variable indicating the number of tangible rewards 
of the campaigni. Control_variablesi is a list of variables that may be associated with the 
campaigni’s status of success and extent of success, including video, pic_num, wordcount, 
location, sub_category, target, duration, month and intangible_reward_num.  
Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, the outcomes of campaigns in the “hybrid donation” group and the 
“pure donation” group should be compared. Specifically, prosocial campaign initiators 
have the freedom to choose to offer tangible rewards or not according to their wishes. 
Therefore, the adoption of tangible rewards seems to be a self-selection process, which 
may cause endogenous problems. If the endogenous problems exist, the results may be 
seriously biased. Particularly, offering of rewards may be a facet of campaign quality. 
Therefore, the pure effect of offering tangible rewards on campaign outcomes may be 
confounded by campaign quality, or more generally, by campaigns’ inborn features. To 
solve the endogeneity bias due to self-selection, a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
method (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) is conducted in this paper. The function of PSM is to 
match campaigns with tangible rewards (treatment group) to campaigns without tangible 
rewards (comparison group) to create counterfactuals for campaigns in the treatment group.  
Specifically, the PSM method uses a campaign’s inborn features to estimate the campaign’s 
probability of adopting tangible rewards. The probability is defined as the campaign’s 
propensity score. Campaigns’ propensity scores offer effective ways to balance the 
different campaign features in the treatment and comparison groups. Based on campaigns’ 
propensity scores, every campaign in a treatment group can find one (or more) matched 
campaign(s) with similar propensity score(s) in a comparison group. After this matching 
process, the results will no longer be biased because all the confounded variables are 
controlled for by the propensity scores. Accordingly, it is then possible to estimate the pure 
effect of the treatment (offering tangible rewards) on campaign outcomes. 
Campaigns’ propensity scores can be calculated using a logit regression. In this regression, 
the dependent variable is whether a campaign offers tangible rewards 
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(tangible_reward_dummy) and the independent variables are the campaign’s inborn 
features (video, pic_num, wordcount, location, sub_category, target, duration and month). 
Inborn features are ideal covariates because the features relate not only to the treatment but 
also to campaign outcomes. In addition, they are fixed over time and remain unchanged 
after introducing treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The regression results are 
presented in Table 3. As expected, campaigns with short introductions, fewer pictures and 
no videos are significantly associated with the adoption of tangible rewards, meaning that 
campaigns of lower quality are more likely to offer tangible rewards as a strategy to 
promote fundraising. Campaign duration and campaign target are also positively and 
significantly associated with the probability of adopting tangible rewards. Based on this 
logit regression, all campaigns’ propensity scores are calculated. As a result of the balance 
check, the propensity scores and the covariates are balanced in both treatment groups and 
comparison groups.  
—Insert Table 3 about here— 
In terms of the matching algorithm, the nearest neighbor algorithm without replacement is 
used in this paper. It is one of the most straightforward and common matching algorithms 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). By applying one-to-one exact matching, each campaign in 
the treatment group is matched to exactly one campaign in the comparison group with the 
closest propensity score. In addition, the tolerance level on the maximum propensity score 
distance between two campaigns (caliper) is set as 0.05 for precise matching. As a result, 
404 matched campaigns are collected as the final sample. Half of the sample comes from 
the treatment group and half comes from the comparison group. The descriptive statistics 
and the correlation matrix of the matched sample are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. 
—Insert Table 4 about here— 
—Insert Table 5 about here— 
To evaluate the quality of matching, several tests have been conducted. First, the 
percentage of standard error biases before and after matching are calculated to determine 
whether campaigns with treatment and campaigns without treatment have no significant 
differences in their observable features after matching. The results are presented in Table 
6. The results indicate that before matching, the standard error bias ranges from 18.1% to 
129.8%. However, after matching, it ranges from 2.5% to 8.4%, a sharp decrease in 
standard error. In addition, a t-test is also conducted on the mean value of each campaign’s 
observable features before and after matching. According to Table 6, there are no 
significant differences in each observable feature’s mean value between campaigns in the 
treatment group and campaigns in the comparison group after matching, indicating that 
campaign differences are no longer significant.  
—Insert Table 6 about here— 
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Regarding the model’s goodness of fit, a logit regression is conducted two times using the 
unmatched data set and the matched data set. The dependent variable in this regression is 
whether a campaign offers tangible rewards, and the independent variables are campaigns’ 
inborn features. The results of the regressions, depicted in Table 7, indicate that the Pseudo 
R2 of the unmatched model is 0.384, which presents a good goodness of fit of the model 
(Claeskens and Hjort, 2008). Based on the results of the likelihood ratio (LR) test, the 
unmatched model is significant as a whole and a campaign’s inborn features can be used 
to determine which campaign is more likely to offer tangible rewards. Conversely, the 
Pseudo R2 decreased to 0.016, and the results of the LR test were no longer significant in 
the matched model. Therefore, it is no longer possible to identify which campaign is more 
likely to offer tangible rewards based on its inborn features. To sum up, in terms of inborn 
features, the campaigns in the treatment group and the ones in the comparison group are 
very similar after matching. Thus, the endogeneity problem caused by self-selection has 
been resolved by the PSM method. Next, the hypotheses are tested based on this matched 
sample.   
—Insert Table 7 about here— 
Results  
To rule out multicollinearity, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all variables are 
calculated. The mean VIF value is 2.08, and all other single VIF values range from 1.05 to 
3.79, below the threshold of 5 (Neter et al., 1996). Furthermore, all intercorrelations are 
well within accepted ranges and below the 0.6 level. The only exception is the single high 
intercorrelation between number of intangible rewards and number of pictures (0.84). Here, 
since intangible rewards (e.g. satisfaction, autonomy, welfare) are more difficult to capture 
through imagery (as compared to images of products in the case of tangible rewards), it is 
assumed that, despite being highly correlated, the two present distinct concepts measured 
by distinct measures. Therefore, the models have no multicollinearity problem.  
A binary logistic regression is conducted to test whether offering tangible rewards is 
negatively associated with the final status of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign (H1). As 
the results show in Model 1 from Table 8, the presence of tangible rewards has a significant 
negative effect on the success status of a prosocial crowdfunding campaign (-0.74, p< 0.01). 
Next, a series of OLS regressions are estimated to test whether this negative effect is still 
valid in terms of a prosocial campaign’s extent of success (H2). The results are presented 
separately in Models 2, 3 and 4 of Table 8. Specifically, campaigns with tangible rewards 
tend to a lower total number of backers (-0,24, p< 0.05) and a lower total pledge amount (-
0,70, p< 0.01)) than campaigns without rewards. In addition, offering tangible rewards 
causes a reduction in the completion ratio of a campaign (-0.37, p< 0.01). These results 
support hypothesis H2. Next, the influence of the number of tangible rewards on a 
campaign’s extent of success is tested (H3). The results are reported in Table 9. In line with 
previous predictions, the number of tangible rewards in a campaign is negatively associated 
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with the campaign’s extent of success. With all else being equal, one standard deviation 
increase in a prosocial campaign’s tangible reward number will cause a 7% decrease in its 
total backer number (-0.07, p< 0.001), a 22% decrease in its total pledge amount (-0.22, p< 
0.001) and a 0.07 deduction in its completion ratio (-0.07, p< 0.001).  
—Insert Table 8 about here— 
—Insert Table 9 about here— 
Robustness checks 
To test the robustness of the results, four additional OLS regressions are conducted to 
determine whether the negative effects of tangible rewards remain significant when using 
alternative variables to measure campaign outcomes. Entrepreneurs use crowdfunding not 
only for fundraising but also for expanding the awareness of their work. This expanded 
awareness helps them to extend resources beyond close social networks and offers 
opportunities to market their campaigns to the general public (Gerber and Hui, 2013). 
Therefore, a campaign still has satisfactory outcomes if it expands its public awareness. On 
Zhongchou.com, backers can choose to be fans of crowdfunding campaigns by clicking 
the “like” button or can share campaigns via their social media by clicking the “share” 
button. Thus, the number of fans and the number of shares (both are natural log-
transformed) are introduced as two new dependent variables for robustness checks. The 
results are reported in Table 10. According to Models 8 and 9, the presence of tangible 
rewards has negative effects on a campaign’s total fans number (-0.16, p<0.01) and number 
of shares (-0.22, p< 0.01). The number of tangible rewards is also negatively associated 
with a campaign’s total fans number (-0.05, p< 0.001) and a campaign’s number of shares 
(-0.07, p< 0.001). In summary, the results are found to be robust and consistent across two 
different measures of campaign outcomes.     
—Insert Table 10 about here— 
Discussion  
Generally, our empirical results show support of the cognitive evaluation theory in the 
context of donation-based crowdfunding by exploring the effects of intrinsic motivation 
and extrinsic motivation on prosocial crowdfunding campaign outcomes. This paper offers 
new insights into differentiating hybrid donation model and pure donation model and their 
feasibilities of financing prosocial purposes through crowdfunding, which haven't been 
studied previously.  
Specifically, this paper contributes to the emerging literature of donation-based 
crowdfunding. Our findings show that that campaign’s quality signals such as video, 
picture and description are positively associated with prosocial campaign success, which 
echoes previous studies in the context of reward-based crowdfunding (e.g., Mollick, 2014; 
Agrawal et al., 2015). However, the tangible rewards, which are used to predict 
crowdfunding campaign success (e.g., Burtch et al., 2011; Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; 
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Frydrych et al., 2014), are proved to be negatively associated with campaign success in the 
donation-based crowdfunding context. A potential explanation for this finding may be the 
“crowding-out” effect of extrinsic motivations on intrinsic motivations (De Charms, 2013). 
Furthermore, because of its social feature (Lehner, 2013) and “per se democratic” process 
(Drury and Stott, 2011), our findings confirm the feasibility of financing non-profit 
prosocial projects through crowdfunding, which replicates similar findings in previous 
studies ( e.g., Berliner and Kenworthy, 2017; Lehner, 2013; Allision et al.,2015; Meer, 
2014). In addition, we define and analyze two donation-based crowdfunding models 
(hybrid donation model and pure donation model) and their feasibilities for supporting 
prosocial projects for the first time. By highlighting the differences and between the two 
models, this paper is the first to explore model suitability in the context of supporting 
prosocial purposes through crowdfunding. Based on cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and 
Ryan, 1985), we offer concrete responding to the question why pure donation model is 
better than hybrid donation model in financing prosocial purposes theoretically.  
Our findings are also consistent with previous literature relating to donor behavior 
(Benabou and Tirole 2003; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1993; Gneezy et al., 2011; Lepper 
and Greene, 2015). Based on cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985), we 
analyze the motivational “crowd-out” effect in the context of donation-based crowdfunding, 
which extends the boundary of donor behavior research. Previous studies (e.g., Titmuss, 
1970) have proved the existence of the “crowd-out” effect in prosocial contexts by using 
money as the proxy of extrinsic motivation. In this paper, we extend previous research (e.g., 
Ariely et al., 2009) by testing the function of non-monetary rewards as the proxy of 
extrinsic motivation in the donation-based crowdfunding context. Our results presenting 
the first empirical evidence showing that the “crowd-out” effect is not altered when non-
monetary incentives are adopted in the donation-based crowdfunding context. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of offering tangible rewards on the outcomes of prosocial 
crowdfunding campaigns. Theoretically, this paper aims to shed light on whether extrinsic 
motivations will crowd out intrinsic motivations in prosocial crowdfunding contexts. To 
answer this question, a dataset collected from the largest reward-based crowdfunding 
platform in China is analyzed using the PSM method. According to the empirical results, 
the presence of tangible rewards is negatively associated with prosocial crowdfunding 
campaigns’ outcomes. In particular, the adoption of tangible reward leads to a lower 
probability of meeting the funding target, fewer contributors, lower pledge amounts and a 
lower completion ratio when compared to the campaigns without tangible rewards. These 
negative effects are strengthened if more tangible reward options are offered. 
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on general crowdfunding and donation-
based crowdfunding in particular. Specifically, this paper contributes to the previous 
literature about success factors of crowdfunding campaigns (e.g., Mollick, 2014; Agrawal 
et al., 2015) by presenting the evidence that campaign’s quality signals are also positively 
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associated with the success of prosocial crowdfunding campaigns. Interestingly, while 
prior literature suggests that rewards are positively associated with crowdfunding 
campaign success (e.g., Burtch et al., 2011; Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; Frydrych et al., 
2014) the current study shows that in the donation-based crowdfunding context, tangible 
rewards work in the opposite way. 
In addition, this paper sheds light on the literature stream on financing non-profit social 
entrepreneurship through crowdfunding (e.g., Allision et al.,2015; Meer, 2014). Our 
findings confirm that donation-based crowdfunding is a feasible channel for supporting 
prosocial purposes because of its social feature (Lehner, 2013) and “per se democratic” 
process (Drury and Stott, 2011). However, and most importantly, the current paper 
distinguishes between “hybrid” and “pure” donation campaigns, highlighting the 
differences between these two models of donation crowdfunding campaigning, as well as 
their relative efficiency and fit with successful campaigns. Furthermore, this paper is the 
first to investigate model suitability for financing prosocial purposes through crowdfunding. 
Based on cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985), this paper explains why pure 
donation crowdfunding model is better than hybrid donation crowdfunding model in 
financing prosocial purposes theoretically. 
Our findings also confirm and extend prior research about donor behavior based on 
cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985). Specifically, our findings confirm the 
existence of motivational “crowd-out” effect in prosocial activities (Benabou and Tirole 
2003; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1993; Gneezy et al., 2011; Lepper and Greene, 2015). 
Prior literature has examined the “crowd-out” effect in prosocial contexts by using money 
as the proxy of extrinsic motivations (Titmuss, 1970). In this paper, we extend previous 
research (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009) by using the non-monetary reward as the proxy of 
extrinsic motivation. The findings show that the “crowd-out” effect is not altered when 
non-monetary incentives are adopted.   
This paper also offers several practical implications for both prosocial campaign initiators 
and crowdfunding platform administrators. First, this study empirically demonstrates that 
offering tangible rewards is not an effective strategy to facilitate prosocial campaign 
fundraising via crowdfunding. Therefore, compared to hybrid donation model, pure 
donation model is a more suitable model for prosocial campaign initiators using to raise 
funding.   
Second, it is crucial for the administrators of crowdfunding platforms to apply different 
promotional strategies to different crowdfunding campaigns. They should be aware that the 
supporters who contribute to different kinds of campaigns may be driven by heterogonous 
motivations. Therefore, the promotion strategies should be customized instead of 
generalized according to different kind of campaigns. It may cause unintended results by 
adopting inappropriate campaign promotion strategies. For example, compared to a 
prosocial campaign, contributors of commercial campaigns may not be intrinsically 
motivated to participate in contributing. Instead, they tend to be motivated extrinsically. 
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Therefore, in terms of commercial campaigns, offering extrinsic rewards should be an 
effective promotional strategy for generating more positive fundraising results. However, 
it will work in a totally reverse way if this strategy is used to promote prosocial campaigns 
as the extrinsic rewards may crowd out the intrinsic motivations of prosocial donors. 
Therefore, platform administrators should design appropriate promotional models to 
different campaign categories and provide guidance to fundraisers about which model 
functions best for which type of campaign. In addition, platform website designers should 
highlight the benefits of campaigns from different categories in order to make it easier for 
potential supporters to identify the values created by their contributions. 
Apart from the theoretical and practical insights, this paper also has limitations that offer 
directions for future research. First, although the self-selection bias of tangible reward 
adoption is alleviated by balancing campaign characteristics through the propensity score 
matching method, entrepreneur-related features may also cause self-selection bias. For 
example, experienced entrepreneurs tend to have a lower propensity than novice 
entrepreneurs to adopt tangible rewards as external incentives in their prosocial campaigns. 
Because of their previous experience, they may have better knowledge than novices do 
about designing attractive campaigns. If this is the case, entrepreneurs’ past crowdfunding 
experience should be an important variable associated with tangible reward adoption and 
should be controlled to obtain unbiased results. However, entrepreneur-related information 
is not accessible on this platform. Future research may generate better results by controlling 
the past crowdfunding experience of entrepreneurs.   
In addition, individuals care about their social image when conducting prosocial activities. 
They want to be recognized for altruism rather than egoism in public (Benabou and Tirole, 
2006). Therefore, in addition to intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, social image concerns 
may also be treated as necessary motivations that drive individuals to perform prosocial 
activities (Haley and Fessler, 2005). In this paper, social image concern is not taken into 
consideration for various reasons. It is impossible to find a suitable proxy to measure 
individuals’ social image concern in the platform’s public data. In addition, contributions 
on crowdfunding platforms are always given anonymously (Burtch et al., 2013), which 
may dramatically reduce contributors’ concern for social image. This anonymity may also 
partly explain the negative effects of the “personal recognition souvenirs” on campaign 
outcomes. However, it does not mean that social image concern is not important in the 
prosocial crowdfunding context. Future studies could extend and enrich knowledge by 
finding ways to measure individuals’ social image concern and testing the effects of it on 
donors’ desire to contribute to prosocial campaigns.   
Based on the collected data, the form of tangible rewards is limited to personal recognition 
souvenirs (e.g., t-shirts with a prosocial campaign logo). Therefore, the findings may not 
be generalized to other types of tangible rewards. To further enhance the generalizability 
of the current findings, future studies could explore the effect of extrinsic motivations in 
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the prosocial crowdfunding context by testing and comparing effects across different types 
of tangible rewards.  
Finally, the findings are generated by analyzing the data from a Chinese crowdfunding 
platform. Therefore, the question of whether the results of this study can be applied 
universally remains uncertain. For instance, in some cultures, promoting donation is not 
advocated as it tends to shame the recipients of the donation and donation should not be 
associated with personal aggrandizement. Future studies could enrich our knowledge by 
reexamining the findings of the current study in different crowdfunding platforms that are 
established in different cultural and social environments (e.g., Indiegogo in the US). It 
would also be interesting to conduct comparative studies between crowdfunding platforms 
in different cultural settings to determine whether cultural factors moderate the effects of 
extrinsic motivations in prosocial contexts.  
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Table 1 Variable definitions  
Independent Variable Definition Variable Type 
Tangible_reward_dummy 
1-a campaign offers tangible rewards as 
crowdfunding perks, 0-otherwise 
Dummy 
Tangible_reward_num 
Total number of the tangible rewards of a 
campaign  
Continuous 
Control variable Definition Variable Type 
Ln_target 
Natural log-transformed fundraising goal 
of a campaign (in RMB) 
Continuous 
Ln_duration 
Natural log-transformed fundraising 
duration (in days) 
Continuous 
Video 




Number of pictures a campaign used to 
describe the project 
Continuous 
Intangible_reward_num 




Natural log-transformed number of total 




1-Education, 2-Environment, 3-Childcare, 




A series of dummy variables to show the 
month in which a campaign is established 
Dummy 
Location 
A series of dummy variables to show the 
region where a campaign is established(1-
Northeast,2-East,3-Central,4-West) 
Dummy 
Dependent variable Definition Variable Type 
Status 




Natural log-transformed total number of 
backers a campaign received 
Continuous 
Ln_total_pledge 
Natural log-transformed total money raised 
for a campaign (in RMB) 
Continuous 
Completion_ratio 
The ratio between campaign’s total pledge 











Table 2 Descriptive statistics (all sample) 




Tangible_reward_dummy 2167 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Tangible_reward_num 2167 0.70 2.33 0.00 13.00 
Ln_target 2167 9.52 1.37 6.91 13.82 
Ln_duration 2167 3.52 0.51 2.30 4.50 
Video 2167 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Pic_num 2167 6.18 6.04 1.00 50.00 
Intangible_reward_num 2167 1.31 1.08 1.00 4.00 
Ln_wordcount 2167 7.63 0.58 6.37 9.49 
Status 2167 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Ln_backer_num 2167 3.81 1.01 0.69 9.00 
Ln_total_pledge 2167 8.73 1.87 2.77 14.53 
Completion_ratio 2167 1.23 2.00 0.00 27.25 
Region_1 2167 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Region_2 2167 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Region_3 2167 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Region_4 2167 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Category_1 2167 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Category_2 2167 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Category_3 2167 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Category_4 2167 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Category_5 2167 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 



















 (logistic regression) 
Ln_duration 2.25*** (0.23) 
Ln_target 1.14*** (0.08) 
Ln_wordcount -0.63*** (0.17) 
Video -2.08*** (0.35) 
Pic_num -0.10** (0.03) 
Region_1 0.03 (0.56) 
Region_2 0.07 (0.27) 
Region_3 -0.14 (0.37) 
Category_1 -0.12 (0.36) 
Category_2 -0.01 (0.34) 
Category_3 -0.01 (0.33) 
Category_4 0.02 (0.38) 
Category_5 -0.4 (0.43) 
Constant -16.15*** (1.57) 
N 2167 
pr2 0.38 
Month FE Yes 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 















Table 4  Descriptive statistics (matched sample) 
Variable Obs Mean S. D. Min Max 
Tangible_reward_dummy 404 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Tangible_reward_num 404 3.72 4.20 0.00 13.00 
Ln_target 404 10.86 1.18 6.91 13.82 
Ln_duration 404 3.89 0.42 2.30 4.50 
Video 404 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Pic_num 404 3.50 3.25 1.00 25.00 
Intangible_reward_num 404 0.84 0.91 1.00 3.00 
Ln_wordcount 404 7.61 0.60 6.41 9.15 
Status 404 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Ln_backer_num 404 3.99 1.06 1.39 9.00 
Ln_total_pledge 404 8.88 2.33 2.83 13.91 
Completion_ratio 404 0.66 1.28 0.00 20.17 
Region_1 404 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Region_2 404 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Region_3 404 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Region_4 404 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Category_1 404 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Category_2 404 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Category_3 404 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Category_4 404 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Category_5 404 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 




Note: * p < 0.01
 
Table 5 Correlation matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.Tangible_reward_dummy 1       
             
2.Tangible_reward_num 0.93* 1      
             
3.Status -0.19* -0.25* 1     
             
4.Ln_backer_num 0.03 -0.04 0.36* 1    
             
5.Ln_total_pledge -0.02 -0.15* 0.61* 0.59* 1   
             
6.Completion_ratio -0.12* -0.11* 0.42* 0.32* 0.39* 1  
             
7.Ln_target 0.34* 0.30* -0.26* 0.24* 0.34* -0.22* 1 
             
8.Ln_duration 0.24* 0.22* -0.07* 0.07* 0.02 -0.03 0.14* 1 
            
9.Video -0.15* -0.13* 0.00 0.06* 0.08* 0.01 0.07* -0.03 1 
           
10.Pic_num -0.14* -0.12* 0.02 -0.06* -0.01 0.09* -0.08* 0.01 0.10* 1 
          
11.Intangible_reward_num -0.14* -0.12* 0.02 -0.05* -0.01 0.07* -0.07* 0.01 0.08* 0.84* 1 
         
12.Ln_wordcount 0.01 -0.04* 0.15* 0.14* 0.28* 0.07* 0.16* 0.10* 0.06* 0.04* 0.08* 1 
        
13.Region_1 0.03 0.04 -0.06* -0.04 -0.05* -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 1 
       
14.Region_2 -0.01 -0.02 0.10* 0.12* 0.11* 0.05* 0.02 -0.07* 0.00 -0.03 -0.06* 0.02 -0.28* 1 
      
15.Region_3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07* -0.06* -0.01 -0.04* 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.06* -0.59* 1 
     
16.Category_1 -0.01 -0.03 0.07* 0.03 0.08* 0.05* -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.14* -0.05* 0.05* 0.00 1 
    
17.Category_2 -0.03 -0.05* 0.04 -0.03 0.04* 0.03 -0.02 -0.12* 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05* 0.05* -0.03 0.00 -0.26* 1 
   
18.Category_3 0.05* 0.07* -0.12* -0.05* -0.12* -0.07* 0.06* 0.02 -0.06* 0.01 0.02 -0.20* -0.01 -0.06* 0.01 -0.27* -0.33* 1 
  
19.Category_4 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05* -0.05* 0.00 -0.16* -0.19* -0.20* 1 
 





















U 3.9 3.49 90.4 
93.1 
11.31 0 
M 3.89 3.91 -6.2 -0.65 0.519 
Ln_target 
U 10.99 9.37 129.8 
98.1 
16.98 0 
M 10.88 10.85 2.5 0.27 0.79 
Ln_wordcount 
U 6.94 6.55 18.1 
73.4 
3.58 0 
M 6.94 7.05 -4.8 -0.66 0.51 
Video 
U 0.07 0.3 -60.2 
86.1 
-6.86 0 
M 0.08 0.11 -8.4 -1.05 0.3 
Pic_num 
U 3.56 6.45 -59.9 
87 
-6.53 0 





Table 7 The variance of control group and treatment group before and after 
matching 
Sample Pseudo-R2 
Likelihood Ratio Test Bias 
 chi2-value p-value Means Median 
Unmatched 0.38 515.37 0 33.5 13 















Table 8   The effects of the presence of tangible rewards on prosocial campaign results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Status Ln_backer_num Ln_total_pledge Completion_ratio 
Tangible_reward_dummy -0.74** (0.23) -0.24* (0.1) -0.70** (0.21) -0.37** (0.12) 
Ln_duration -0.57 (0.3) -0.34* (0.14) -0.86** (0.29) -0.59 (0.38) 
Ln_target -0.40*** (0.11) 0.07 (0.04) 0.23* (0.11) -0.21** (0.06) 
Ln_wordcount 1.19*** (0.24) 0.44*** (0.1) 1.36*** (0.19) 0.47*** (0.12) 
Video -0.95 (0.49) -0.24 (0.22) -0.27 (0.42) -0.25 (0.13) 
Pic_num -0.14* (0.05) -0.05* (0.02) -0.08 (0.05) -0.05 (0.03) 
Intangible_reward_num 0.3 (0.21) 0.07 (0.09) 0.07 (0.19) 0.25 (0.16) 
Region_1 -0.72 (0.76) -0.31 (0.3) -0.27 (0.62) -0.15 (0.18) 
Region_2 0.38 (0.33) 0.28* (0.13) 0.37 (0.3) 0.24* (0.1) 
Region_3 0.18 (0.48) 0.06 (0.21) 0.15 (0.42) 0.27 (0.2) 
Category_1 -0.04 (0.43) -0.08 (0.21) 0.35 (0.38) -0.08 (0.17) 
Category_2 -0.03 (0.42) -0.01 (0.2) 0.2 (0.41) -0.05 (0.17) 
Category_3 -0.16 (0.41) -0.01 (0.2) 0.02 (0.39) 0.06 (0.19) 
Category_4 -0.61 (0.45) -0.12 (0.23) -0.09 (0.43) -0.05 (0.21) 
Category_5 0.06 (0.5) -0.09 (0.25) 0.32 (0.45) -0.09 (0.18) 
Constant -2.84 (2) 1.31 (0.91) -0.46 (1.87) 1.41 (1.36) 
N 404 404 404 404 
Pr2/r2 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.11 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 






















Table 9 The effects of the tangible reward number on the prosocial campaign's extent of success  
  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Ln_backer_num Ln_total_pledge Completion_ratio 
Tangible_reward_num -0.07*** (0.01) -0.22*** (0.03) -0.07*** (0.01) 
Ln_duration -0.32* (0.13) -0.79** (0.26) -0.58 (0.38) 
Ln_target 0.06 (0.04) 0.23* (0.1) -0.22** (0.07) 
Ln_wordcount 0.39*** (0.09) 1.21*** (0.19) 0.42*** (0.11) 
Video -0.24 (0.2) -0.28 (0.39) -0.25* (0.12) 
Pic_num -0.05* (0.02) -0.07 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03) 
Intangible_reward_num 0.07 (0.09) 0.09 (0.18) 0.25 (0.16) 
Region_1 -0.3 (0.29) -0.22 (0.57) -0.14 (0.18) 
Region_2 0.27* (0.13) 0.35 (0.29) 0.23* (0.1) 
Region_3 0.08 (0.2) 0.23 (0.38) 0.28 (0.2) 
Category_1 -0.1 (0.2) 0.3 (0.32) -0.1 (0.16) 
Category_2 -0.03 (0.2) 0.16 (0.37) -0.08 (0.16) 
Category_3 0.01 (0.19) 0.08 (0.34) 0.07 (0.19) 
Category_4 -0.09 (0.22) 0 (0.38) -0.02 (0.2) 
Category_5 -0.08 (0.25) 0.35 (0.4) -0.09 (0.17) 
Constant 1.72* (0.86) 0.81 (1.63) 1.92 (1.42) 
N 404 404 404 
r2 0.19 0.34 0.14 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 























Table 10 Robustness check 
  
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 Ln_fans Ln_shares Ln_fans Ln_shares 
Tangible_reward_dummy -0.16** (0.12) -0.22** (0.14)     
Tangible_reward_num     -0.05*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) 
Ln_duration -0.06 (0.16) -0.26 (0.19) -0.04 (0.16) -0.24 (0.19) 
Ln_target 0.06 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) 
Ln_wordcount 0.52*** (0.11) 0.31* (0.13) 0.49*** (0.11) 0.26* (0.13) 
Video -0.13 (0.23) -0.03 (0.29) -0.13 (0.22) -0.04 (0.28) 
Pic_num 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
Intangible_reward_num -0.13 (0.1) -0.09 (0.11) -0.13 (0.11) -0.09 (0.11) 
Region_1 -0.03 (0.34) -0.08 (0.36) -0.02 (0.33) -0.06 (0.35) 
Region_2 0.40* (0.19) 0.3 (0.18) 0.40* (0.19) 0.29 (0.18) 
Region_3 0.46 (0.27) 0.26 (0.27) 0.49 (0.26) 0.28 (0.27) 
Category_1 0.52* (0.21) 0.53 (0.28) 0.51* (0.2) 0.51 (0.27) 
Category_2 -0.39 (0.22) 0.63* (0.26) -0.4 (0.22) 0.62* (0.26) 
Category_3 -0.27 (0.19) 0.59* (0.26) -0.25 (0.19) 0.61* (0.25) 
Category_4 -0.18 (0.21) 0.64* (0.3) -0.16 (0.2) 0.67* (0.29) 
Category_5 -0.01 (0.25) 0.48 (0.33) 0 (0.25) 0.49 (0.34) 
Constant -0.12 (1.14) 1.39 (1.22) 0.19 (1.1) 1.79 (1.18) 
N 404 404 404 404 
r2 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.09 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
